

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS FROM NO NIGHT FLIGHTS: DEADLINE 3

Our written representations are in several documents.

This document is NNF01. It summarises our concerns under nine headings:

- A. No National Need**
- B. The Polluter's Forecasts Are Not "Worst Case" (1st issue - operational assumptions)**
- B. The Polluter's Forecasts Are Not "Worst Case" (2nd Issue – night flights)**
- B. The Polluter's Forecasts Are Not "Worst Case" (3rd Issue - disasters and PSZs)**
- B. The Polluter's Forecasts Are Not "Worst Case" (4th issue - job creation)**
- C. The Polluter's Noise Assessments Are Flawed and Misleading**
- D. The Polluter Isn't Paying for Damage to Our Health**
- E. The Polluter Isn't Paying for Damage to The Habitats of Other Species**
- F. The Polluter Would Make A Bad Situation Worse for Our Roads**
- G. Can the Polluter pay for acquisition, development and mitigation?**
- H. The Land Would Be Better Used for Employment and Housing Needs**
- I. The Public Have Been Misinformed About the Application and Support Is Less Than Claimed**

Each section of **NNF01** (A – I) is preceded by references to the principal issues and questions raised by the Examining Authority (ExA) as well as to the previous relevant representation submitted by No Night Flights in October 2018. These references are included to show context and relevance of the NNF representations. They are not part of the representations.

Each of the summarised NNF concerns, together with a summary of the associated representations addressed to the ExA, can be found in the **column shaded in yellow**.

The other column in NNF01 points to the evidence for the concern, and to some footnotes. Copies of documents referred to which are not Government publications will be sent separately in pdf format.

The material on which the summary is based is set out in eleven documents prepared by NNF as our written representations. Each addresses significant aspects of the developer's application:

- NNF02: "No Room for Late Arrivals" – a study of the UK air cargo market**
- NNF03: Analysis of Falcon report on viability of an airport at Manston**
- NNF04: Analysis of KCC's Position Statement on Manston Airport**
- NNF05: Analysis of Avia report on viability of an airport at Manston**
- NNF06: Critique of Volume I of Azimuth Associates' report**
- NNF07: Critique of Volume II of Azimuth Associates' report**
- NNF08: Critique of Volume III of Azimuth Associates' report**
- NNF09: Review of issues relating to noise, night flights, and impact**
- NNF10: Review of issues relating to the effectiveness of the s.106 Agreement**
- NNF11: Critique of Volume IV of Azimuth Associates' report**
- NNF12: Study - "Getting it wrong locally : misrepresentation of the applicant's proposals"**

To facilitate handling, these documents are being submitted separately from this one. All are referred to in NNF01. They each contain a great deal of supporting evidence, detail and commentary. We invite the ExA's particular attention to them.

Please note that we have referred to the applicant in our summary representations as "the Polluter". This is not gratuitous, it is intended to sharpen the focus on the fundamental environmental principles set out in the Directive governing the UK law for this application (precautionary, prevention, rectification-at-source, and polluter pays) EU. Directive 2011/92/EU (as amended).

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS FROM NO NIGHT FLIGHTS: DEADLINE 3

NNF01

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A – No National Need

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Need.

- i. National and regional airports and air transport policy and guidance
- ii. UK airport air cargo capacity and forecasts, including locational demands and cargo types/ markets

Compulsory Acquisition.

The compelling case in the public interest for Compulsory Acquisition

See also ExA Questions: ND. 1.1-2 and ND1.5 – 46 and CA.1.9

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- No evidence of UK government policy demand for a new dedicated air cargo hub, or any suggestion that Manston could or should fulfil such a role, were it to be needed.
- Lack of evidence of market demand for a new dedicated freight airport
- Consequent lack of compelling case in the public interest to seize this land for RSP's project

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

1. The ExA should determine the application in the light of the Government finding that a new runway at Heathrow will meet national infrastructure need for runway capacity in the south east – with no national role for Manston's runway identified.

EVIDENCE

"[...] The Secretary of State considers that the contents of the Airports NPS will be both important and relevant considerations in the determination of an application [for development consent for an airport development not comprised in an application relating to the Heathrow Northwest Runway] particularly where it relates to London or the South East of England. Among the considerations that will be important and relevant are the findings in the Airports NPS as to the need for new airport capacity and that the preferred scheme [i.e. Heathrow Northwest Runway] is the most appropriate means of meeting that need." Airports NPS, June 20 18, para 1.41

A – No National Need

2. The ExA should dismiss as inapplicable the Government's support for expansion of existing runway capacity outside Heathrow. The applicant's case for NSIP status rests on acceptance that there is zero existing runway capacity at Manston. Accordingly, the application should be treated as proposing new runway capacity, not a development of existing operational consents.¹

"Our case is that the current capability of the airport to support air transport movements is zero. That is because, due to the current state of the airport, planning permission would be required for development (as defined by s.55 of the Town and Planning Act 1990 and s.32 of the Planning Act 2008) either to replace, re-establish or introduce infrastructure for the first time. 9. Further, even if such infrastructure was provided, the airport would still not be capable of providing 'air cargo transport services' for cargo aircraft, which by virtue of s23(9) of the Planning Act 2008 are aircraft 'engaged in the transport of cargo on commercial terms', without instrument approach or departure procedures. If these were provided then a European Aviation Safety Agency Aerodrome (EASA) Certificate would be mandatory, since the airport has a paved runway of over 800m¹. This brings in various other requirements as to minimal infrastructure provision that would also require planning permission." (NSIP Justification – July 2018, paras 8&9

3. The ExA should in any event note that Government support for local runway expansion cannot be taken as endorsement for a new international cargo hub handling perhaps around 1/3 of the UK's total freight market, because such support is qualified by parallel Government commitments in the Airports NPS to:

- avoid market distortion

"[the Government are] supportive of airports beyond Heathrow making best use of their existing runways. However, we recognise that the development of airports can have positive and negative impacts, including on noise levels. We consider that any proposals should be judged on their individual merits by the relevant planning authority, taking careful account of all relevant considerations, particularly economic and environmental impacts. [...] It is important that government intervention is driven by evidence to ensure market distortion is kept to a minimum as supporting regional air routes can have unintended negative effects on the market as a whole. These include distorting competition between airports which are close together or subsidised routes replacing commercially viable routes. Moreover, it is important that road and rail links throughout the UK are properly accounted for in any assessment of total domestic connectivity." Airports NPS, June 2018, para 1.39 and 4.10

¹ c.f. comment by the then Secretary of State for Transport: 'My hon. Friend [Sir Roger Gale] has led this campaign and never misses an opportunity to mention Manston airport, not only in the Chamber but every other time I meet him. [...] My hon. Friend is talking about setting up a completely new operation at Manston, and I wish him well in his campaign. Oral answers: 14 December 2015. C.f. also representations to the Government by the then operators Infratil following publication of the 2015 Davies report

A – No National Need

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • meet binding international carbon emission targets within an effective national strategy 	<p>The Government have assessed the compatibility of its support for expansion of existing runways with the UK's climate change commitments on the basis that the additional capacity will contribute no more than 3,000 ATMs by year 2040 for all UK airports. <i>Making Best Use of Existing Runways, June 2018, paras 1.11-13 and Table 1</i></p> <p>The Committee on Climate Change recently published a letter of 12 February 2019 to the Secretary of State for Transport recording that the Government have accepted the Committee's planning assumption that UK aviation emissions in 2050 should be around their 2005 level. It is very difficult to see acceptance of 17,000-80,000 additional ATMs as consistent with this target.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ensure that claimed national and local economic benefits are verified and balanced carefully against adverse impacts on the environment and human rights. 	<p>This appears to be the key legal duty placed upon the UK Government in determining airport expansion plans, namely to determine a fair balance between economic and environmental factors (explained in ECHR Grand Chamber judgment in <i>Hatton and Others v. the UK (read with s6 Human Rights Act 1998)</i>)</p>
<p>4. The ExA should give weight to the fact that no government policy published since the aerodrome at Manston commenced semi-commercial² use in 1989 identified more than a local and regional aviation role for this site, typically categorising it as one of a group of smaller and less significant airports in the south east, despite a relatively long runway³ and an often supportive local planning environment.</p>	<p>The 2003 White Paper text stated: <i>"The operators of Southend, Lydd and Manston argue that their airports could grow substantially and each has plans for development. The potential of other airports, including, Shoreham, and Biggin Hill, should also not be overlooked. We consider that all these airports could play a valuable role in meeting local demand and could contribute to regional economic development. In principle, we would support their development, subject to relevant environmental considerations. [...] In summary, our principal conclusions about new runway capacity in the South East are: [...] we support, in principle, development of smaller airports in the South East to meet local demand subject to relevant environmental considerations"</i>.⁴ White Paper on Aviation, 2003 paras 11.98, 11.99 and 11.11</p>

² "Semi-commercial" because the MOD continued to subsidise many of the maintenance and operational costs

³ Though there are 12 longer UK runways – 6 if military aerodromes are excluded (leaving Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester, Sheffield and East Midlands) . Manston's runway is not long enough to allow a fully-laden, fully-fuelled 747-400F (the work-horse of the air freight industry) to take off

⁴ Now withdrawn – see Transport Department website

A – No National Need

5. The ExA should accept the consensus of successive expert studies about the viability of Manston and its contribution beyond local and regional purposes, given a) distance from market, and b) noise and impact on Ramsgate.

For “successive expert studies”, please see below and consider NNF’s separate and related submissions: NNF02 – “No Room for Late Arrivals”; NNF03 – Analysis of Falcon report on viability of an airport at Manston; NNF04 – Analysis of KCC’s Position Statement on Manston Airport; NNF05 – Analysis of Avia report on viability of an airport at Manston. The expert studies:

- 2002 report on South East and East of England Regional Air Services (SERAS) – see table on p455, also “*site is unlikely to be greatly affected by spill from major South East airports due to poor accessibility and environmental concerns.*”⁵
- 2003 White Paper on Aviation (quoted above)
- 2014 Falcon Consultancy: “*Aircraft are getting bigger, which means that more passenger seats are available from the major airports [...] the growth [in] air cargo can be absorbed in the belly-holds of passenger aircraft.*”⁶
- 2015 Airports Commission whose teams of consultants considered and rejected a bid from the then operator, commenting that “*switching on*” Manston would require regulatory and financial inducements⁷
- 2015 Kent County Council (in evidence to the Parliamentary Transport Commission inquiry into smaller airports) “*KCC gave strong support to various investors but the reality of commercial aviation at Manston Airport led to very significant losses.*”⁸
- 2016 Avia Solutions: “*it is most unlikely that Manston Airport would represent a viable investment opportunity even in the longer term (post 2040), and certainly not during the period of the Local Plan to 2031.*”⁹
- 2017 York Aviation (disowning Dr Dixon’s reliance upon their work): “*When properly interpreted, our forecasts of air freight demand and capacity across the UK as a whole, taking the role of belly-hold fully into account, show that, to the extent that there is any need for additional pure freighter movements, there is plenty of freighter capacity at Stansted and East Midlands to accommodate any growth. These airports are better located relative to the market and the key locations for distribution within the UK.*”

⁵ “Impact on heritage property or valuable landscape areas is potentially an issue at Manston and Southend.”

⁶ See “Expert Opinion on the Prospects for the Viable Development of Manston Airport” – Falcon Consultancy Ltd, July 2014, summary submitted separately as NNF 03

⁷ The exact words used: “No commercial details provided, but acceptance that viability is dependent on finding the right fiscal signals or regulatory mechanisms to persuade airlines and air cargo carriers to loosen their attachment to the principal London airports and enable Manston to be “switched-on” as a “relief valve” for the regions [sic] most congested airports, implies that private sector funding may be difficult to attract.”

⁸ See “Manston Airport under private ownership: the story to date and future prospects” – a Position Statement by Kent County Council – March 2015, summary submitted separately as NNF 04

⁹ This conclusion was arrived at despite Avia’s use of favourable financial assumptions when making its assessment of future viability.

A – No National Need

The ExA should reject as unsubstantiated the applicant's central contention that the UK air-freight market requires a new hub at Manston: this rests entirely on work whose methodology and conclusions have been discredited and whose sole author is a former close colleague of a principal RSP director who identifies herself as a member of the applicant's team. The ExA should note the flawed nature of the reports by Azimuth Associates (in reality, the work of Dr Dixon) as well as the official UK Government predictions of demand for all-freighter capacity, calling into question the economic case for the application, and the compelling case in the public interest for compulsory acquisition.

Please consider the separate and related submissions **NNF06, NNF07, NNF08 and NNF11**, which contain NNF's detailed **critiques of the four Azimuth reports**, updated to February 2019. These demonstrate clearly the insubstantial and speculative nature of the Azimuth work and its misleading use of sources.

Regarding abiding market choice for London see also "Sky High Value", a 2014 study by the Freight Transport Association *"We cannot dictate which venue global shippers want to use for their goods. Heathrow has developed through market preference. If we try to determine where an airport should be, the market may well ignore us, and its choice may not then be within the UK"* (p9).

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (1st issue – operational assumptions)

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Operational issues.

ii. Air Traffic Movements

See also ExA Questions: NS.1.7, NS.1.14, NS 1.24 and OP.1.5, NS 1.27 and 1.35 OP.1.1, OS.1.7, SE.1.15 and Tr.1.10

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- Unsatisfactory “worst case” calculations and assumptions, underpinning all assessments.

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

1. The ExA should reject the applicant’s forecasts as an unacceptable basis for calculating “worst-case” environmental and socio-economic impacts. The applicant has not assessed the full range of possible effects provided by the permission he seeks. He has instead put forward what he believes is probable, rather than what could be possible (as is required), especially in relation to:

- the physical capacity of the proposed development (i.e. 83,220 freight aircraft movements, plus passenger and scrap aircraft movements, plus possible night flights)

EVIDENCE

The so-called “Rochdale envelope” judgment calls for “sufficient information to enable ‘the main,’ or the ‘likely significant’ effects on the environment to be assessed [...] and the mitigation measures to be described”[...] such an approach will then feed through into the mitigation measures envisaged [...] It is important that these should be adequate to deal with the worst case, in order to optimise the effects of the development on the environment” (Quoted in PINS Advice Note No 9 ‘Using the Rochdale Envelope’ July 2018, Version 3)

The applicant appears to have assessed impacts according to his team’s predictions about likely commercial demand for the services he proposes to offer and not the physical capacity of the proposed development, which he states is merely “theoretical” ([APP-080, para 1.35). Whilst he may be correct in supposing it improbable that the freight market could ever demand the full physical capacity of his proposal it is also implausible that ‘worst-case’ will never be more than the applicant’s business prediction for year 20 in 2039. What impact would a 10% underestimate have across his Environmental Assessment and the noise compensation contours?

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (1st issue – operational assumptions)

- scenario planning, where the applicant fails to identify and elaborate plausible combinations of uncertainties which could result in greater demand for underused airport capacity than its team’s market judgements predict
- operating assumptions where RSP needs to substitute realistic “worst-case” forecasts for hopeful speculations about e.g. aircraft types in use in 2039, airspace approvals from the CAA and ICCAN, runway preference and usage, demand for passenger ATMs, and the need for Public Safety Zones, all of which have significant implications for the applicant’s calculations about environmental and socio-economic impact as well as profitability - and thus viability.

The type of aircraft predicted to be flown in 2039 and the proportion expected to be flown at night (as set out in *Appendix 3.3 to Chapter 16 of the Environmental Assessment* appears unduly optimistic and not to have taken account of what past operations suggest about market uncertainties and the commercial pressure to exploit night-time runway capacity, despite historical operating agreements.

The applicant claims at the start of Chapter 12 of the Environmental Statement that his predictions are “*robust worst-case*” in assuming that future generation aircraft will produce the same noise as today’s equivalent aircraft.¹⁰ However, he reduces his predictions of LAS(max) noise impact in year 20 to take account of his hopes that cargo operators will use quieter aircraft in the future.¹¹

The official records held by the Kent International Airport Consultative Committee (discussed in the **submission NNF09**) show approximately 70% of aircraft overfly Ramsgate on landing and take-off over Herne Bay – reflecting the predominant south west winds.

A “worst-case” only a few percentage points above the applicant’s prediction would appear to require the construction of Public Safety Zones (PSZs) impacting significantly on residential streets in the Nethercourt Estate and the approved Manston Green development of 785 dwellings. The possible construction and compensation costs of PSZs have not been assessed, even as a “worst-case”.

¹⁰ “It is expected that noise from next generation aircraft will be quieter than today’s aircraft however actual noise levels are still uncertain. Therefore, for the ES, a robust worst-case assessment of noise from future aircraft types has been undertaken assuming that future generation aircraft will produce the same noise as today’s equivalent aircraft “[emphasis added](see ES Table 12.1)

¹¹ “The reduction from Year 2 is due to the forecast phase out of the Boeing 767-300 and Boeing 767-400 aircraft in the fleet” (see ES 12.7.55)

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (1st issue – operational assumptions)

2. The ExA should insist upon robust “what if?” worst-case scenario analysis to accompany any proposals for localised arrangements (e.g. s106) to confine the Proposed Development within the parameters requested and assessed for the DCO. Local experience shows that such agreements are subject to commercial and political pressures and re-negotiation in the future. The most effective cap is Government refusal to develop physical capacity for higher numbers than have been assessed and agreed.

For discussion of the record of the Kent International Airport Consultative Committee’s consideration of actual noise and night noise created please see parallel **submission NNF09**). See also parallel **submission NNF10**, which is a review of issues relating to the effectiveness of the previous s.106 agreement to manage aviation use of Manston. This paints a depressing picture of ongoing pressure to vary planning caps in the s106 agreement in the light of ongoing business failure and local political concerns about employment prospects. “Worst-case” scenario planning should factor in likely attempts to water down what would otherwise be agreements to protect the public from damaging exposure to noise.

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (2nd issue – night flights)

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Operational issues.

iv. Night flights

See also ExA Questions: ND.1.16, ND.1.28, ND.137

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

Noise. Significance of night flights to the applicant’s business case.

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

3. The ExA should require a realistic “worst-case” assessment of the prospects for night flights at the proposed development in the light of the weight of evidence regarding the importance of night flights to all-freighter operations and the need for Manston to compete effectively for scarce business.
4. The ExA should reject completely the applicant’s assessment of the noise impact of his proposals for night flights.-

EVIDENCE

Please see the separate, parallel **submission NNF09**, which addresses various aspects of the night-flights issue and calls for a probing examination by the ExA.

For the dependence of the all-cargo market on night flights see e.g. Eurocontrol’s review “*The ins and outs of all-cargo flights*” (September 2017) and their earlier authoritative study “*Dependent on the dark: cargo and other night flights in European airspace*” (Eurocontrol, 2009)

As noted in Section A above, and quoted in footnote 6, the *Davies Commission team* concluded that “switching on Manston” would require significant regulatory and financial inducements. Night flights, especially if (as proposed by the applicant) they include QC4-rated aircraft now banned at the London airports could provide such a powerful inducement, especially as night noise curfews begin to bite elsewhere..

Given the applicant’s need to compete in a declining cargo-only market coupled with Manston’s well attested geographical limitations it is implausible that he will operate with no or very limited night flights, despite his repeated public assurances. The absence of an explicit ban on planned night flights in the application and the proposal of a negotiable quota tend to suggest the applicant’s intention to prop up an airport operation at Manston by capturing the bottom end of the freight market – noisy QC4 night flights banned at the majority of other UK airports.

The incompatibility with international standards of the applicant’s assessment of night time noise is summarised below (**section C**) and in the parallel submission **NNF09**. Mr Freudmann should recall from his appearances before the local airport consultative committee (KIACC) the large number of public complaints frequently generated by a single 85 dB flight: for him now to present a metric insisting that such events would need to exceed 18 a night to create a significant nuisance is offensive.

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (3rd Issue – disasters and Public Safety Zones))

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Operational issues.

vi. Safety

See also ExA Questions: OP.1.7 – OP.1.10

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

Multiple safety issues including Public Safety Zones, risk contours, proximity of population densities over 40,000, number of schools under flight path, aircraft altitude over town, lack of proximate major A&E/trauma centre

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

5. The ExA should demand a realistic “worst-case” assessment of effects deriving from the vulnerability of the project to risks of major aviation accidents and/or disasters, taking account of the history of accidents at the site as well as the particular risks associated with cargo flights.

EVIDENCE

At its peak in 2009, Manston handled 30,000 tonnes of cargo a year with only 435 flights but produced several potentially fatal incidents reported to the local consultative committee (KIACC). Two examples: In August 2010, a KAM Air plane “struck its tail on the runway and the grass surface beyond the runway before becoming airborne during take-off from Manston Airport (United Kingdom (*Commission Regulation (EU) No 1071/2010*)). Any similar incident could result in major loss of life at Cliffsend or the Manston Green development of 785 homes (500m from the end of the runway and directly under the flight path). In 2012, in a vortex incident in Southwood Gardens (2.5km to runway), the entire roof fell into a neighbour’s garden narrowly missing her. If this had happened at nearby Chilton Primary School during playtime, there would have been significant loss of life.

The applicant proposes some forty times the number of ATMs which generated those accidents. Moreover, these are overwhelmingly cargo flights where older and more fully laden aircraft are typically used, increasing risk. Evidence suggests that 2/3rds of flights would be over the populous area of Ramsgate, which is not 4km from the runway as RSP contends (currently, the built-up area begins 1.3km from the runway and is directly under the flightpath). It is 4km across Ramsgate from the Marina to the runway. The town is atop two cliffs. There are 3 schools directly under the flight path (see following table).

“In approximate terms the aircraft will finally descent (sic) at 52m for each kilometre travelled, such that at the Marina, aircraft would be 235m above the aerodrome level (54m), or 289m above sea level.” (*London Manston Airport, Aircraft Noise Assessment and Mitigation Report, June 2003, p14*)¹²

School	Number of Pupils	Distance from Runway	Height of Aircraft
Chilton Primary School	422	1.8km	150m (land dips)
Christ Church Primary School	253	2.75km	185m
Chatham & Clarendon Grammar	1372	3.5km	209m

¹² Forwarded with NNF 09

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (3rd Issue – disasters and Public Safety Zones))

6. The ExA should require the applicant to address thoroughly the need for Public Safety Zones (PSZ) and their implications for existing and planned residential development as well as the costs for the project.

The applicant makes no provision for PSZs, perhaps because his stated Y20 target of 17,100 cargo ATMs annually is below the threshold sometimes quoted for requiring PSZs (18,000) . However, the physical capacity of the development is over 80,000 ATMS, and the application comes without any proposed cap on use of capacity. Moreover, the applicant wants permission to build further stands for passenger aircraft and end-of-life aircraft, so the number of ATMs may certainly exceed 17, 100i. The applicant’s talk of even a theoretical capacity of 83,000 ATMs appears to be absurd but if anything over 20,000 ATMs is even a remote possibility then RSP ought to have included PSZs in its application.

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (4th Issue – job creation)

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Socio-economic issues:

- i. Effects on the tourism/holiday trade
- ii. Estimates of employment generation
- iii. Scope for local employment

See also ExA Questions ND.1.32 – 1.42; 1.45 – 1.47 and SE.1.1 – 1.16

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- Lack of evidence how the Proposed Development would overcome the fundamental limitations of the peninsular location of Manston within the UK and the South-east, plus the significantly lower cost of belly-hold operations.
- Critiques of the work submitted by Azimuth associates.
- Unsoundness of applicant’s net employment creation projections
- Assessment of adverse impacts on visitor-led regeneration plans (tourism, leisure, the arts, local attractions and visitor facilities)

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

EVIDENCE

7. The ExA should decline to give weight to the applicant’s job creation forecasts except to the extent that they:

Please see the parallel **submissions NNF08 and NNF11**, which show that the applicant’s job creation forecasts rest entirely on the qualitative analysis of a team member, Dr Sally Dixon. Both submissions demonstrate that Dr Dixon’s work is inherently speculative and that it has no regard to the history of Manston, especially to the multiple evidence of business failure and inflated job forecasting strongly associated with the past commercial operations at Manston. It should be noted by the ExA that Dr Dixon and her colleague, Mr Freudmann, appear to have been personally associated with some of these.

- give evidence where the jobs are likely to be created

RSP Directors misled the public by repeatedly advertising - despite recorded requests for correction - that the 26,000 indirect/catalytic jobs that Dr Dixon predicts Manston will create somewhere in the global economy would all be created in East Kent. They also implied that jobs generated by the proposed business model do not require to be offset against jobs lost by the competition or adjusted for other “double-counting” risks

- give evidence how far jobs are likely to be filled by local residents

Ramsgate Town Council point out that “*Extraordinary claims must be backed up by extraordinarily strong verifiable evidence*” (Summary of oral representations submitted to the ExA by Richard Styles). The applicant’s case is flimsy, based on secondary sources and with assumptions which appear not to have been submitted for scrutiny by the relevant authorities and interests.

B – The Polluter’s Forecasts are not “Worst Case” (4th Issue – job creation)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • identify and take into account economic loss to other airports and cross-channel operators 	<p>Please see discussion of impact on other freight operators in parallel submission NNF06 . In a declining UK market for UK dedicated air freight, the jobs notionally created by the applicant’s proposal will result in the loss of the jobs at other UK airports or freight hauliers.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • acknowledge and learn lessons from over-optimistic job forecasting by the applicant’s leading team members in relation to past operations at Manston 	<p>See also NNF06. The need for particular caution handling aviation job predictions is evidenced in e.g. “Airport Jobs: False Hopes, Cruel Hoax” Aviation Environment Federation, March 2009. This finds: <i>“Master Plans are inconsistent, and their employment forecasts are little better than guesses – designed to influence politicians and planners. Claims that airports create ‘indirect’, ‘induced’ and ‘catalytic’ jobs are based on dubious statistical concepts.”</i></p>
<p>8. The ExA should require a realistic “worst-case” assessment of adverse impact of aircraft noise on official plans for visitor-led regeneration as well as on existing businesses related to tourism, leisure, the arts, local attractions and visitor facilities. The ExA should pay regard to the multiple representations from fledgling Ramsgate businesses and the Town Council. The ExA should subtract estimated job losses in these employment sectors from RSP’s estimated job gains.</p>	<p>Ramsgate is one of the first 10 Heritage Action Zones selected by Historic England to “<i>achieve economic growth by using the historic environment as a catalyst</i>”. HE’s website states: “<i>The aim is for the Heritage Action Zone to grow Ramsgate into a prosperous maritime town where outstanding heritage and architecture coupled with new investment and development strengthens the economy for the benefit of the local community.</i>” RSP’s application appears to attach little if any significance to the likely deterrent on visitor-related investment and development of a 90-100 dBa (SEL) noise footprint across much of the Heritage Action Zone.</p>

C. The Noise Assessments and Compensation Arrangements are Flawed and Inadequate

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Noise ...

- i. The assessment of effects on humans and faunal species
- ii. The Noise Mitigation Plan including the choice of relevant noise contours
- iii. The use of aircraft quota count restrictions
- iv. Cumulative effects of aircraft and road traffic noise.

(including Heritage etc:)

- i. The effect on Conservation Areas, including Acol and Minster
- ii. The effects on Scheduled Monuments
- iii. The effects on Listed Buildings
- iv. The effects on heritage assets within the airport site
- v. Management and mitigation of impacts on archaeological features

See also ExA Questions: EC.1.1, 6, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20; F.1.3, F.1.9, HE1.8 - 19 ; NS.1.1-38; OP1.1 – 6, 11, 13,14; SE.1.9,

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

Noise and Night flights

- Real aviation impact data from previous operations at Manston undermines applicant's predictions
- Multiple concerns about the collection, calculation and presentation of noise measurements and predictions. These concerns include the host authority's technical queries which appear on pages 326-352 of RSP's Consultation Report. These comments, concerns and questions by TDC were all dismissed by the applicant¹³
- Likely ineffectiveness of the noise mitigation plan
- Impact of night flights on health; educational attainment; quality of life and on the affected area's tourism-dependent economy
- Impact of noise on local heritage assets, and regeneration of the Heritage Action Zone.

¹³ Following inappropriate political intervention – PINS have the emailing on this and should be asked to share it with the ExA

C. The Noise Assessments and Compensation Arrangements are Flawed and Inadequate

NNF REPRESENTATIONS	EVIDENCE
<p>1. The ExA should reject as fatally flawed the noise forecasts and modelling used by the applicant to assess disturbance and the need for compensation, because:</p>	<p>The issues summarised below, especially the applicant’s apparent disregard for historical empirical data available locally about the generation and propagation of aircraft noise, is discussed in the related submission NNF09.</p> <p>See also the noise footprints at Figures 1 and 2 below this summary.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> predictions of the maximum aircraft noise that will be experienced as a result of this proposal appear seriously inconsistent with “ground truth” - noise footprints actually produced by identical or comparable aircraft flying from Manston prior to its closure 	<p>At 12.7.55 of the Environmental Assessment the applicant theorises that in his “worst case” year 20, 10,139 dwellings will be exposed to maximum noise levels in excess of 80 dB LAS(max). This appears considerably lower than the number calculated by independent noise consultants in the past with real noise measurements and the same INM approach.¹⁴ Expert noise consultants calculated the numbers of people within a 85 dB (A) SEL contour produced by a flight departure to the east is “up to 30,903 [people] for the Boeing 747-400”. The applicant has chosen to present his figures in terms of households rather than people, nor is the dB(A)SEL metric identical. However, the threshold is 5dB higher and it focussed solely on noise impact to the east of the runway. It did not include people living to the west of Manston. It would seem that the 80dB(A)SEL contour is likely to include at least twice the number of people estimated by the applicant – between 40,000 and 50,000 people.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> unsound and unsafe local sources appear to have been used for establishing ambient noise “discounts” for noise modelling, raising substantive doubts about accuracy and compromising confidence in the approach generally 	<p>NNF questions the selection of sites for establishing baseline ambient noise monitors for RSP’s environmental assessment and hence the applicant’s ability accurately to “discount” its aircraft noise impact predictions. Enquiries showed that a) most of the monitors were located in the gardens of people actively lobbying for return of aviation at Manston and b) at least some monitors appear to have been sited adjacent to localised sources of intense ambient noise, e.g. a giant local tree roost for noisy birds and e.g. between the A299 and the railway track.¹⁵</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> assumptions that noise will be managed by directing flights over less populous areas by using the western runway appear highly dubious and certainly not “worst case” 	<p>The official records held by the Kent International Airport Consultative Committee (surveyed in NNF09) show approximately 70% of aircraft overflying Ramsgate on landing and taking-off over Herne Bay – reflecting the predominant south west winds. See also Figure 3 (at the end of this summary) showing the geographical distribution of complaints about noisy aircraft during past operations at Manston.</p>

¹⁴ Bickerdike Allen Partners – report to Charles Buchanan, Manston Airport of 28/09/2010: “Manston Airport night noise assessment review”

¹⁵ See NNF 09

C. The Noise Assessments and Compensation Arrangements are Flawed and Inadequate

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> assumptions about the noisiness of aircraft in future fleets appear not be “worst case” 	<p>The predictions on aircraft type are in the applicant’s Appendix 3.3. The applicant states that he has reduced his predictions of LAS(max) noise impact in year 20 to take account of his hopes that cargo operators will use quieter aircraft in the future.¹⁶</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> assumptions about RSP’s ability to manage noise at night by offering daytime capacity rest on beliefs in business success. These are contradicted by the record of business failure and desperation at Manston and the evidence of consequent pressure to capture the bottom end of the cargo market by allowing dedicated cargo planes to operate at night 	<p>See B2 above. This is a crucial consideration, especially in relation to any suggestion that the ExA could properly entrust key aspects of the protection of our future health and environment (themselves the subject of UK government international responsibilities) to toothless local community mechanisms.</p>
<p>2. The ExA should seek independent expert verification of the applicant’s use of certain noise measurement metrics, which appear spurious or defectively handled, in particular:</p>	<p><i><u>NNF notes that the law requires the ExA to ensure that he has “access as necessary to, sufficient expertise to examine the environmental impact assessment report” (see Article 5(3)(b) of the parent law in Directive 2011/92/EU (amended))</u></i></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the “awakening” metric by which the applicant dismisses as insignificant aircraft noise levels at night in excess of 80 dB LASmax unless the average number of noise events during the night above this level is already at least 18, 	<p>See below and the more detailed discussion in NNF09. The applicant’s own estimates show that at least 11,356 dwellings in year 2 will be exposed to over 80 dB LASmax at night (his Figure 12.8). But he dismisses this as insignificant because the average number of noise events during the night will (he says) be lower than 18. This counter-intuitive and idiosyncratic ‘awakening’ metric claims to be “informed by emerging best practice and research into aircraft induced sleep disturbance, undertaken by Basner et al (2006)”. NNF have located two reports by Basner, in 2004 and 2006, neither of which appear to refer to the 18 flights per night threshold. The applicant’s ideas of “emerging best practice” should be shown to the Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise.</p>

¹⁶ “The reduction from Year 2 is due to the forecast phase out of the Boeing 767-300 and Boeing 767-400 aircraft in the fleet” (see ES 12.7.55)

C. The Noise Assessments and Compensation Arrangements are Flawed and Inadequate

- application of the so-called Temple Aviation Noise Metric developed for Historic England as a method for assessing the impact of aviation noise on the built heritage - and presented by the applicant as a justification for its counter-intuitive findings about flying super-jumbos at low level over historic Ramsgate,

The applicant appears:

- inappropriately to use average noise measurements, whereas the Report indicates that absolute values would be appropriate where there is currently no aircraft noise affecting the site, i.e. RSP should count all heritage assets within the 80dB LAS(max) footprint.¹⁷
- to rely on a desk study rather than specific qualitative site surveys to disregard guidance applicable to particular heritage assets e.g. Minster Abbey (Grade 1) with its Enclosed Order of contemplative Benedictine nuns; the Shrine and Visitor Centre at St Augustine's (Pugin) Church Ramsgate; the Reculver Towers monument (also within the 80dB footprint).

- over-reliance on metrics which mask the impact of the aircraft by dividing it over 16 hour and 8-hour periods – metrics which are increasingly criticised as insufficient or misleading by international and national authorities – especially where there is no existing aviation.

In general, the applicant dismisses as “negligible” or “insignificant” any aircraft noise during the day which his own “averaged out” calculation makes less than 50 dB LAeq (averaged over 16 hours). This allows him to show a lower number of households adversely affected (13,046), obscuring the 30,000 – 40,000 victims who will be exposed to around 80dB LAS (max) events around seventy times each day. NNF believes that independent guidance on this important and contentious topic should be sought from the Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise or, if they are not functioning in time for the Examination, from expert sources directly appointed by the ExA. In the meantime, **we suggest that the applicant should be required to accompany any presentation of noise contours with one showing the “ground truth” i.e. the LAS (max) noise footprint produced by a laden cargo plane of the 747-400 kind very likely to be in use in Year 20**. Almost all Ramsgate is within the 80 dB (A) SEL noise footprint of a 747-400 arriving from the east (**NNF Figure 2**). Aircraft are at a height of 289m as they cross the harbour arm at Ramsgate and descend over the town to the runway.

¹⁷ Aviation Noise Metric - Research on the Potential Noise Impacts on the Historic Environment by Proposals for Airport Expansion in England, Project No. 6865 Final Report Temple Aviation, see e.g. pages 18 and 37 and 5.3.

C. The Noise Assessments and Compensation Arrangements are Flawed and Inadequate

3. The ExA should conclude that the “polluter pays” principle embedded in the Directive has been breached because the applicant has failed to propose any mitigation for the adverse effects it admits it will cause to the perceived quality of life of thousands of local people, and to their enjoyment of their gardens, open space amenities as well as to their homes as well as to their health.

Even on the noise impact assessment presented by the applicant (which appears to be an underestimate, as explained above) there is admitted to be permanent “significant” adverse impacts from noise by day and by night on the perceived quality of life on the communities of Ramsgate, Pegwell Bay, St Nicholas, West Stourmouth and Manston (ES 12.7.70) plus a perceived change in the acoustic character of shared open spaces within these communities.

No mitigation is proposed to address the loss of quality of life or to compensate for the impairment of open space amenities (whether personal gardens and balconies or shared spaces).

4. The ExA should reject the proposed sound insulation scheme as manifestly inadequate. It takes no account of its impracticality for listed dwellings and those in conservation areas; and excludes the relatively high number of mobile and caravan homes in proximity to the former airport. It is also unclear what if any mitigation is available for schools or community buildings such as health centres and libraries within the 80dB LAS_(max) footprint.

According to ES Table 12.8, only 115 properties expected to be exposed to “averaged out” noise levels calculated by RSP to exceed 63 dB LAeq (16 hours), and only 225 properties expected to be exposed to noise levels above the night- time level of 55 dB LAeq (8 hours) will receive the standard insulation grant. Note too that this is a “grant” towards the cost to which the householder may well need to contribute. In any event, the polluter is evidently not proposing to pay for the impacts it will have on those who wish to continue to use their windows to ventilate their homes. The polluter isn’t paying for the impact of its proposal

Manston Court Caravan Site and Preston Parks are assessed by the applicant to have “significant” daytime inter-related noise and visual effects (ES 12.55).

D. The Polluter isn't Paying for Damage to Our Health

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

viii. Public health, including night flights and cumulative effects

vii Impacts on land and water quality, including effects on the aquifer and drainage discharge to designated nature conservation sites

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- Multiple health and well-being issues, including evidence from research on the impact of heavy aviation on the health of proximate population densities (especially the young, sick and elderly), air quality, the absence of an emission mitigation plan, exclusion of road traffic pollution from key modelling, and water pollution issues

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

EVIDENCE

1. The ExA should not support an application which

Please see the section on health impact in the separate submission **NNF09**.

- admits, at the least, a “moderate adverse effect on human health”, including a 3 – 4% increase in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], but contains no proposals to mitigate this (No one should have to give his or her life to make money for the applicant)

Environmental Assessment Chapter 15 (Health and Wellbeing and Cumulative Effects) presents various serious adverse impacts on human health associated with exposure to aviation noise but no discussion of any options to mitigate such effects. It would be far-fetched to suggest that sound insulation grants can reduce the adverse psychological and physiological health outcomes associated with aviation noise at the levels proposed.

- provides no detailed consideration of cumulative effects, or as regards long term health impacts upon young people

Annoyance has not been included as a health outcome, as recommended by the WHO7 and the Interdepartmental Group on Costs and Benefits Noise, despite the salience of the night flights issue and experience of high levels of annoyance and sleep-disturbance. Nor has the applicant expressed noise impacts in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Years or in monetary terms.

Research such as the so-called RANCH study underline that children have a special need for uninterrupted sleep for growth and cognitive development. Chronic and consistent aircraft noise exposure in children has been demonstrated to be associated with impairment of reading and long-term memory

D. The Polluter isn't Paying for Damage to Our Health

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• fails to provide information recommended by the World Health Organisation	<p>The Government has acknowledged that the public is becoming more sensitive to aircraft noise, to a greater extent than noise from other transport sources, and that there are health costs associated from exposure to this noise.¹⁸ The applicant claims (15.7.8 of the Environmental Assessment) to have addressed the sensitivity of local communities affected and identified local health needs and objectives but provides evidence only of measuring the magnitude of potential impacts.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• fails to take into account local health needs and objectives and community sensitivities	<p>The applicant reports consultation with local health chiefs in which they explain local challenges and compromised health outcomes. However, there is no evidence that he has taken any particular account of these in his assessment, for example the likelihood that his plans will further increase the number of strokes in an area already subject to high levels of such risk.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• overlooks health impacts in public green spaces as well as amenity spaces such as private gardens and balconies.	<p>Public Health England believe the proposed sound insulation scheme will not protect amenity spaces (such as private gardens) from increased noise exposure. The ExA has already noted that the absence of recorded health impacts in the assessment regarding public green spaces reflects the fact that none were identified as receptors by RSP.</p>

E. The Polluter isn't Paying for Damage to the Habitats of Other Species

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Habitat Regulations Assessment and effects on biodiversity – to include:

- i. Likely significant effects on European protected sites and species, including conclusions regarding effects on integrity
- ii. Effects on other habitats and species, including bird scaring techniques and habituation

See also ExA Questions Aq.1.4, Ec.1.1 - 14

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- Multiple concerns regarding impact assessments relating to the eleven statutory designated sites located within 11 miles of the site, and the three Priority Habitats within 1 mile of the site, and concerning proposed mitigation measures

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

EVIDENCE

1. The ExA should note that the UK Government's strategy for meeting binding international carbon emission targets assumes that its support for expansion of existing runways will not have a significant national impact (as would the applicant's plans).

The Government have assessed the compatibility of its support for expansion of existing runways with the UK's climate change commitments on the basis that the additional capacity will contribute no more than 3,000 ATMs by year 2040 for all UK airports! *Making Best Use of Existing Runways, June 2018, paras 1.11-13 and Table 1*

2. The applicant has failed to satisfy Natural England that his plans will not cause long term disturbance to rare and protected nesting birds and waders and their habitats. "Averaging out" 80dB LA(max) is not an available strategy for assessing the impact on birds and a site and population specific approach is called for, including contours to 55dB LA(max).

There are serious concerns about levels of disturbance and pollution at sensitive sites at Sandwich and Pegwell Bay. Natural England has disagreed with the application of a crude noise threshold of 70dB LA(max), evidencing that reactions to much lower noise levels can generate moderate behavioural responses in birds (e.g. increased vigilance) which may impact foraging efficiency in some circumstances and thus reduce survival). NE also disagrees with the Applicant's unevicenced claims that golden plover in the vicinity of the Project Site may be habituated to sudden, high noise levels as a result of various agricultural activities (ES 7.8.58 and 7.8.67).

F. The Polluter Would Make A Bad Situation Worse for Our Roads

<p>PRINCIPAL ISSUE</p> <p>(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)</p>	<p><i>Traffic and transport ...</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Strategic transport modelling, including the traffic effects of the Proposed Development on the national road network, notably the M2/ A2 corridor and cumulative impacts with other proposed developments ii. The effects of construction traffic iii. The effects of operational traffic, including to and from the proposed fuel farm iv. The effects of freight traffic <p>See also ExA Questions Tr.1.1 – Tr.1.49</p>
<p>NNF OUTLINE CONCERN</p> <p>(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)</p>	<p>Traffic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple issues, including modelling of congestion and traffic emissions, the supply of aviation fuel (and alternatives to the Jentex site).
<p>NNF REPRESENTATIONS</p> <p>1. The ExA should reject plans which, in the words of the Highways Authority, have “not demonstrated that the development will have an acceptable impact on highway safety or that the residual cumulative impacts on the road network would not be severe.”</p>	<p>EVIDENCE</p> <p>KCC comments make plain that the proposals would be likely to exacerbate traffic problems on adjacent highway links such as Manston Road and Manston Court Road and, even more seriously, would make a bad situation worse at pinch-points in the national network, namely the M2 J7 and A2-A258 Duke of York Roundabout (the latter have been ignored by the applicant)</p>

F. The Polluter Would Make A Bad Situation Worse for Our Roads

1. The ExA should not accept a Transport Assessment which is:

- by its own admission incomplete
- heavily based on unrealistic assumptions about HGV movements, loading and airport staff movements
- includes highway mitigation proposals that deliver only partial benefits, and disregard the Thanet Transport Strategy
- conflicts with the Highway's Authority's plans to safeguard key road schemes and junction improvements
- fails to address daily peaks in either local traffic or airport traffic, where additional traffic may impact on existing congestion issues.

The Environmental Assessment Volume 15: 3.2.1 admits that proper traffic modelling has not been completed.

G. Can the Polluter Pay for Acquisition, Development and Mitigation?

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

Funding – to include:

- i. Sources and availability of funding and the degree to which bodies have agreed to make financial contributions or to underwrite the Proposed Development, and on what basis such contributions or underwriting are to be made
- ii. Responsible bodies, including details of relevant Company assets, structures, ownership and Directors
- iii. The bases for the estimates of costs
- iv. Funding for Compulsory Acquisition if authorised, including for blight
- v. Funding for the Noise Mitigation Plan

See also ExA Questions: F.1.1 - F.1.8

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

- Lack of evidence of secured funding for credible compensation and mitigation costs
- Need for transparent and robust financial projections for funding the Proposed Development, and a fully prepared investment appraisal

The ExA should treat as critical to the application:

- absence of Government demand and funding for a new national airport for dedicated freight
- or
- absence of a developed business case, showing assumptions and robust financial projections as well as a fully prepared investment appraisal, that demonstrates that such an airport is commercially and financially viable.

NNF is in difficulty addressing this topic beyond the broad principles because the applicant has produced so little in response to the various requests for financial information made to it over several years. There is plainly a premium on showing secured funding for the total costs of the project and it seems a minor public scandal that the Examination has got to this stage without this being done. The PINS letter to the applicant of 14 August 2018 stated that “*the Funding Statement poses substantial risk to the examination of the application*” and spoke of early action to correct this. Unfortunately, in February 2019 the applicant has still failed to come up to proof and appears to be relying on a gamble that sufficient investment will materialise if a DCO is granted. This approach is to treat the DCO process as a mechanism of venture capitalism, which – given the substantial interference here with the human rights of the landowners - it plainly cannot be.

H. The Land Would Be Better Used for Employment and Housing Needs

<p>PRINCIPAL ISSUE</p> <p>(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)</p>	<p><i>Local policy – to include:</i></p> <p>i. The status of, and policy framework provided by, the Saved Policies from the 2006 Thanet Local Plan and the Draft Thanet Local Plan – 2031</p>
<p>NNF OUTLINE CONCERN</p> <p>(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desirability of enabling the host authority to meet future housing needs with significantly less use of greenfield sites • The plans proposed by the owners of the site, offering local people homes and jobs and investment by regeneration specialists.
NNF REPRESENTATIONS	EVIDENCE
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The ExA should give weight to the letter of 28 January 2019 from the Minister for Housing, Communities and Local Government’s (“MHCLG”) to the leader of Thanet District Council. This confirms Local Plan Intervention measures in view of the ongoing failure to plan for and deliver the homes people need in Thanet, noting: <i>“Thanet is within the top third of Districts in England for high housing pressure, based on average affordability ratios.”</i> 2. The ExA should consider the merits of the plans being put forward by the current owners of the site and take account of the loss to the area of these benefits were the DCO (and compulsory purchase) to be granted. Such losses include not just jobs, leisure facilities, community support infrastructure, new open space and housing but also the green field sites that will have to be developed in order to meet the District Council’s housing targets if the aerodrome is to be preserved. 	<p>The ExA will see that local politicians have prevented the Manston site owner from progressing its proposed development despite strong evidence from officers that <i>“Following the evidence and Government guidance, there is insufficient justification to retain the Airport designation during the period of the Local Plan”[...]</i><i>“The recommendation to Members is therefore to continue the proposal for mixed uses on the site as part of the draft Local Plan.”</i></p>

I. The Public Have Been Misinformed About the Application and Support Is Less Than Claimed

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

(as identified by ExA on 11 December 2018 and 18 January 2019)

These representations follow the ExA's verbal invitation at the preliminary hearing to provide further information about local support for the application.

NNF OUTLINE CONCERN

(from NNF reps. of 6 October 2018)

NNF REPRESENTATIONS

EVIDENCE

Key aspects of the scheme have been misrepresented locally by the applicant and his supporters.

This topic is addressed the separate **submission NNF12**. This shows that public opinion locally has been badly and wilfully misinformed. The evidence shows that, for the key issues of night flights, job creation and noise, the applicant's presentation of its proposals locally fell well below an acceptable standard of accuracy.

Support for the applicant's proposed international cargo hub (as distinct from a local/regional airport and passenger services) is much less than claimed

See also **NNF12**. Evidence is lacking to support claims such as those made by the local MP to the ExA that an "overwhelming majority" of the local public support the plans. This almost certainly conflates some local support in principle for the return of a small regional airport providing passenger flights with backing for the proposed cargo hub. Even the applicant's report on the consultation (APP/6.1) does not show two-thirds want a cargo hub. That figure is available only if we include those who told the applicant that they wanted "no night flights" and by including those whose who went no further than favouring a return of aviation in principle. The RSP figures presented in the Consultation Report submitted with the original application (now withdrawn) showed much more clearly that only around half wanted the proposed cargo hub, fewer on some possible additions of his figures. We know that not all of these supporters are local.

Inspection of the PINS website indicates that the ExA appears to have received more public representations against the proposal than in favour of it.

Figures 1 and 2: Noise footprint of an arriving 747-400 Bickerdike Allen Partners)



